Can German courts stop “Hellfire” from Ramstein? by Dołgowski, Karoline
Can German courts stop “Hellfire”
from Ramstein?
Völkerrechtsblog 2019-05-15T14:31:22
Being a Saarbrücken-based legal scholar traveling regularly to Frankfurt, the sight
of the American Ramstein Air Base (or “Ramstein” for short) approaching just before
Kaiserslautern is nothing unusual. Most of the time, the high fences on the left side
go unnoticed, unless perhaps one of the US Airforce “Globemasters” is casually
floating over the highway.
This was different on my last trip to Frankfurt – when spotting Ramstein triggered my
full attention and made me launch into elaborate explanations on the special status
of Ramstein under the NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which allows
the US to operate on German territory as long as US activities respect German law,
especially the German Constitution and German obligations under international
law. Why did I bore my spouse with these reflections? The reason was the recent
Judgement of the Higher Administrative Court for North Rhine-Westphalia (OVG
NRW) of 19th March 2019 on the responsibility of the German Government to ensure
compatibility with international law of US drone strikes operated via Ramstein. Aside
from the fact that Ramstein is the most important drone base outside the US, what is
so interesting about this case and why is it significant? Let’s take a closer look.
What happened? – The Facts of the Case
The case was brought before the court by three Yemeni plaintiffs, who claimed
that their relatives Ahmed Salem bin Ali Jaber (Salem) and Waleed bin Ali Jaber
(Waleed) were killed in a US drone strike in the Province of Hadramaut (Yemen)
in 2012. Salem, an imam, openly criticized Al-Qaida during a sermon. This did not
go overlooked by local extremists, who summoned him for a talk. When Salem,
accompanied by Waleed – one of the town’s policemen –, met with three Al-Qaida
men, a US drone struck the group, killing all five men. The plaintiffs allege that the
three local extremists were the intended targets of the attack, while Salem and
Waleed were collateral damage in a “signature strike”, an attack where the US target
an unidentified person based on a pattern of suspicious behaviour as identified
through metadata. The plaintiffs claimed that they were offered condolences and
awarded a “condolence payment” of $ 155,000 by “Yemeni officials”. However, they
were offered neither official acknowledgement of or redress for the strike, nor a
written statement that the condolence payment was from the US government. The
plaintiffs questioned the lawfulness of the attack, which to their knowledge had not
been investigated by an independent body.
The plaintiffs first sued the US before the D.C. District Court and the D.C. Circuit
Court, but to no avail. On appeal, the latter decided that the alleged extrajudicial
killings by drone strike were non-justiciable, as they concerned a political question.
Next, the plaintiffs turned against the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) because
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of the essential importance of the Ramstein Air Base for US drone strikes. Indeed,
while the selection and analysis of targets, the final decision over single attacks as
well as the lead of missions all take place in the US, Ramstein is continuously being
used for the relay of flight control data necessary for armed drone strikes in Yemen.
Also, the plaintiffs claimed that a team of analysts as part of the Distributed Ground
System (DGS) is stationed at Ramstein, assisting the US-based mission teams
by monitoring drone strikes through onboard cameras matching the pictures with
information and intelligence with respect to terrorist activities. The plaintiffs sought to
oblige the FRG to prevent the use of Ramstein for attacks that violated international
law.
In 2015, the first instance administrative court of Cologne dismissed the case
concluding that the German government had fulfilled its obligation to protect
the plaintiffs’ lives by verifying, through consultations with the US Government,
that Ramstein was only used within the limits of the NATO Status of Forces
Agreement. It found that a case-by-case assessment of US drone strikes was de
facto impossible for the German government and could jeopardize Germany’s
trustful relationship with the US. Therefore, the first instance court concluded that the
German government was within its rights to balance its legal duties with foreign and
defence policy interests. The plaintiffs appealed against this decision, leading to the
judgment of the Higher Administrative Court for North Rhine-Westphalia (OVG NRW)
that I would like to discuss presently.
The judgement of the Higher Administrative Court for North Rhine-Westphalia
(OVG NRW)
The OVG NRW regarded the action as admissible and at least partially well-founded.
It dismissed the plaintiffs’ request for a total ban on the use of Ramstein for armed
drone operations, but considered that Germany had to adopt “suitable measures”
to ensure that US drone strikes operated via Ramstein complied with international
law. If necessary, Germany would have to work with the US towards compliance with
international law.
The OVG NRW held that this duty to adopt “suitable measures” arose under the
German government’s constitutional obligation to protect the plaintiffs’ right to life
as enshrined in Article 2 (2) (1) of the German Basic Law (BL). The plaintiffs were
entitled to the protection of Article 2 (2) (1) BL even though they were not German
nationals and not located on German territory (but in Yemen) because there was a
sufficient link with the German State. Indeed, the use of Ramstein for the relay of
data necessary for the drone strikes in Yemen meant that the acts threatening the
right to life carried out by the US were conducted essentially from German territory
and hence from within the sphere of German territorial authority and responsibility.
The OVG NRW further held that the constitutional obligation to protect the right to
life comprises an obligation to ensure that conduct originating from German territory
is in line with Germany’s obligations under international law. In opposition to the
first instance Court (and the D.C. Circuit in the corresponding US case), the OVG
NRW did not grant the German government an unlimited discretion regarding the
assessment of the compatibility of US drone strikes with international law. On the
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contrary, the OVG NRW considered that issues such as the qualification of persons
or objects as legitimate military targets are not political, but legal questions. It thus
declared itself competent to examine the government’s conduct in this regard, on the
basis of Article 20 (3) BL in conjunction with Article 19 (4) BL.
The court then proceeded to assess the compatibility of the US drone strikes
with international law, examining notably possible infringements of international
humanitarian law and human rights law. It found that there were strong indications of
violations of both regimes. In Yemen, this was in particular due to air strikes targeting
persons who, having lost their “continuous combat function”, could not be considered
combatants – and therefore legitimate military targets – any longer, air strikes
bringing about (disproportionate) civilian losses as well as a lack of investigation
concerning the compatibility with international law of these strikes.
The decision is subject to appeal before the Federal Administrative Court and as
such not final.
Why is this case so significant?
Allow me to forward three remarks regarding the decision.
First, it is remarkable that the OVG NRW – in opposition especially to the US courts
– has clearly established that assessing the compatibility of any state conduct
with international law is not a political, but a legal question, and as such subject to
judicial scrutiny. Moreover, and contrary to the first instance court, it did not blur this
distinction by granting the government an infinite margin of discretion in matters
of foreign affairs. However, even though treating the question of compliance with
international law as a legal question, the OVG NRW shied away from making a
final decision on the compatibility with international law of the American use of
armed drones in Yemen. Concluding to the general incompatibility of such use with
international law would have compelled the court to order the German government
to ban the use of Ramstein for armed drone operations, as the plaintiffs demanded,
which would have been – as Sauer put it  – a thunderbolt (“Paukenschlag”). Instead,
the court reverted to a much softer obligation, ordering the German Government
to take “suitable measures” to ensure that US drone strikes operated via Ramstein
comply with international law, hence allowing the Government a limited margin
of discretion after all. The German Government will however no longer be able
to simply put up with the US Government’s assurance that any action carried out
from Ramstein is in accordance with international law, but is under an obligation to
actively ensure adherence to international law.
Secondly, worth of attention is the thorough reasoning of the court developing the
FRG’s constitutional obligation to protect the plaintiffs’ right to life as enshrined
in Article 2 (2) (1) BL, linking it to the duty of the FRG to assure adherence to
international law. Upholding the long-standing principle of “openness to international
law”, the court reasons that Germany is obliged to respect international law (Article
20 (3) BL), which is incorporated into national law through Article 59 BL (regarding
international treaties) and Article 25 BL (regarding customary international law and
general principles of law). This obligation not only comprises the duty to refrain from
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any infringement of international law, but also to ensure that Germany will, within its
sphere of territorial authority and responsibility, ensure the adherence to international
law if other states seek to violate it. However, the OVG NRW’s reasoning stops
short of investigating the question if such an obligation to protect the plaintiffs’ right
to life could also be derived directly from international law. From an international
law perspective, it would have been desirable if the court had e.g. elaborated on
the question if an obligation to adhere to the principle of distinction arises directly
under common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions I – IV, which lays down an
obligation to respect and ensure respect for the Conventions in all circumstances,
or if the obligation to protect the plaintiffs’ right to life could also arise under Article
6 (1) ICCPR. This would also have been an opportunity for the court to elaborate
on the extraterritorial applicability of the ICCPR, which is being denied by the US.
While the Court’s domestic approach on this matter might be entirely satisfactory
for the development of German constitutional law dedicated to the incorporation
of international law, it would have been beneficial for the impact of the decision on
the international level if the court had moved out of its comfort zone and actually
taken up the challenge to tackle the questions of direct obligations arising under
international law.
Finally, and despite the criticism I just voiced, it can be said that the court has shown
a great willingness to ensure the implementation of international law on the national
level. This is a major step in the right direction, especially if other local Courts follow
the example of the OVG NRW and become more willing to take up the task of
enforcing international law. It is true that the OVG NRW has not outruled drone
strikes operated via Ramstein as it could have after its analysis of the compatibility
of the attack with IHL and HR. However, such a ruling would likely not have been
upheld in the next instance, as political pressure would have been far too strong.
The delivered judgment with its “soft approach” has good chances to survive a
(possible) appeal and might, therefore, be more effective than a “nuclear solution”
would have ever been. The decision thus has the potential to be of great impact on
the role courts as well as the executive (through diplomatic, political and soft law
mechanisms) will play in enforcing international law.
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